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Wormhole attacks can negatively aﬀect the localization in wireless sensor networks. A typical wormhole attack can be launched
by two colluding attackers, one of which sniﬀs packets at one point in the network and tunnels them through a wired or wireless
link to another point, and the other relays them within its vicinity. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the wormhole attack
on the localization and propose a novel distance-consistency-based secure localization scheme against wormhole attacks, which
includes three phases of wormhole attack detection, valid locators identification and self-localization. The theoretical model is
further formulated to analyze the proposed secure localization scheme. The simulation results validate the theoretical results and
also demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our proposed scheme.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1] consist of a large
amount of sensor nodes which cooperate among themselves
by wireless communications to solve problems in fields such
as emergency response systems, military field operations,
and environment monitoring systems. Nodal localization
is one of the key techniques in WSNs. Most of current
localization algorithms estimate the positions of location-
unknown nodes based on the position information of a set
of nodes (locators) and the internode measurements such as
distance measurements or hop counts. Localization in WSNs
has drawn growing attention from the researchers, and com-
prehensive approaches [2–6] are proposed. However, most
of the localization systems are vulnerable under the hostile
environment where malicious attacks, such as the replay
attack or compromise attack [7], can disturb the localization
procedure. Security, therefore, becomes a significant concern
of the localization process in hostile environment.
The wormhole attack is a typical kind of secure attacks in
WSNs. It is launched by two colluding external attackers [7]
which do not authenticate themselves as legitimate nodes to
the network. When starting a wormhole attack, one attacker
overhears packets at one point in the network, tunnels these
packets through the wormhole link to another point in
the network, and the other attacker broadcasts the packets
among its neighborhood nodes. This can cause severe
malfunctions on the routing and localization procedures in
WSNs. Khabbazian et al. [8] point out how the wormhole
attack impacts on building the shortest path in routing
protocols. For the localization procedure under wormhole
attacks, some range-free approaches [9, 10] have been
proposed. We will propose a range-based secure localization
scheme under wormhole attacks in this paper.
To prevent the eﬀect of wormhole attack on the range-
based localization, we propose a distance-consistency-based
secure localization scheme including three phases: worm-
hole attack detection, valid locators identification and self-
localization. The wormhole attack detection is designed to
detect diﬀerent types of wormhole attacks. For the valid
locators identification, diﬀerent identification schemes are
proposed under diﬀerent wormhole attacks. Both basic
approach and enhanced approach are devised using these
identification schemes. We formulate the theoretical model
to analyze the probability of detecting wormhole attacks and
the probability of successfully identifying all valid locators.
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Simulation results show the eﬀectiveness of our proposed
scheme and validate the theoretical results.
As a summary, this paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
(i) a novel wormhole attack detection scheme is pro-
posed to detect the existence of a wormhole attack
and to further determine the type of the wormhole
attack;
(ii) a basic identification approach is designed to identify
the valid locators for the sensor. Two independent
algorithms are proposed to handle diﬀerent worm-
hole attacks;
(iii) an enhanced identification approach is developed
which achieves better performances than the basic
approach;
(iv) theoretical analysis on the probability of detecting
wormhole attacks and the probability of successfully
identifying all valid locators are conducted and
verified by simulations.
(v) simulations are conducted to further demonstrate
the eﬀectiveness of the proposed secure localization
schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we discuss the related work on the secure
localization. Section 3 describe the network model and the
attack model of the system. The secure localization scheme is
proposed in Section 4. Section 5 gives the theoretical analysis
and Section 6 presents the simulation results. Section 7
concludes the paper and outlines our future work.
2. Related Work
The secure localization in hostile environment has been
investigated for several years and many secure localization
systems have been proposed [11, 12].
To resist the compromise attack, Liu et al. [13] propose
the range-based and range-free secure localization schemes,
respectively. For the range-based scheme, a Minimum Mean
Square Estimation method is used to filter out inconsistent
beacon signals. For the range-free scheme, the nodes adopt
the voting-based location estimation which can ignore the
minor votes imposed by the malicious nodes. SPINE [7]
utilizes the verifiable multilateration and verification of
positions of mobile devices into the secure localization in the
hostile network. The mechanism in [14] introduces a set of
covert base stations (CBS), whose positions are unknown to
the attackers, to check the validity of the nodes. ROPE [15]
is a robust positioning system with a location verification
mechanism that verifies the location claims of the sensors
before data collection. A suit of techniques in [16] are intro-
duced to detect malicious beacons which can negatively aﬀect
the localization of nodes by providing incorrect information.
TSCD [17] proposes a novel secure localization approach to
defend against the distance-consistent spoofing attack using
the consistency check on the distance measurements.
To detect the existence of wormhole attacks, researchers
propose some wormhole attack detection approaches. In
[18], packet leashes based on the notions of geographical and
temporal leashes are proposed to detect the wormhole attack.
Wang and Bhargava [19] detect the wormhole attack by
means of visualizing the anomalies introduced by incorrect
distance measurements between two nodes caused by the
wormhole attack. Reference [20] further extends the method
in [19] for large scale network by selecting some feature
points to reduce the overlapping issue and preserving the
major topology features. In [21], a detection scheme is
elaborated by checking whether the maximum number of
independent neighbors of two nonneighbor nodes is larger
than the threshold.
To achieve secure localization in a WSN suﬀered from
wormhole attacks, SeRLoc [9] first detects the wormhole
attack based on the sector uniqueness property and commu-
nication range violation property using directional antennas,
then filters out the attacked locators. HiRLoc [10] further
utilizes antenna rotations and multiple transmit power levels
to improve the localization resolution. The schemes in [13]
can also be applied into the localization against wormhole
attacks. However, SeRLoc and HiRLoc need extra hardware
such as directional antennae, and cannot obtain satisfied
localization performance in that some attacked locators may
still be undetected. Reference [13] requires a large amount
of computation and possibly becomes incompetent when
malicious locators are more than the legitimate ones. In
[22], Chen et al. propose to make each locator build a
conflicting-set and then the sensor can use all conflicting
sets of its neighboring locators to filter out incorrect distance
measurements of its neighboring locators. The limitation
of the scheme is that it only works properly when the
system has no packet loss. As the attackers may drop
the packets purposely, the packet loss is inevitable when
the system is under a wormhole attack. Compared to
the scheme in [22], the distance-consistency-based secure
localization scheme proposed in this paper can obtain high
localization performance when the system has certain packet
losses. Furthermore, it works well even when the malicious
locators are more than the legitimate ones, which causes the
malfunction of the scheme in [13].
3. Problem Formulation
In this section, we build the network model and the attack
model, describe the related definitions, and analyze the eﬀect
of the wormhole attack on the range-based localization, after
which we classify the locators into three categories.
3.1. Network Model. Three diﬀerent types of nodes are
deployed in the network, including locators, sensors, and
attackers. The locators, with their own locations known
in advance (by manual deployment or GPS devices), are
deployed independently in the network with the probability
of Poisson distribution. Each locator has a unique identifi-
cation. The attackers collude in pairs to launch a wormhole
attack to interfere with the self-localization of the sensors.
All the nodes in the network are assumed to have the
same transmission range R. However, the communication
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range between two wormhole attackers can be larger than
R, as they can communicate with each other using certain
communication technique.
The sensors measure the distances to their neighboring
locators using the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
method; the measurement error of the distance follows a
normal distribution N(μ, σ), where the mean value μ =
0 and the standard deviation σ is within a threshold.
The sensors estimate their locations using the Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method [3]: Assume that the
coordinates of the m neighboring locators of the sensor are
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3), . . . , (xm, ym), respectively, and the
distance measurements from the m locators to the sensor are
d1,d2,d3, . . . ,dm, the location of the sensor (x, y) satisfies
(x − x1)2 +
(
y − y1
)2 = d21
(x − x2)2 +
(
y − y2
)2 = d22
...
(x − xm)2 +
(
y − ym
)2 = d2m.
(1)
By subtracting the last equation from each of the rest in
(1), we can obtain the following equations represented as a
linear equation AX = b, where
A =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
2(x1 − xm) 2
(
y1 − ym
)
2(x2 − xm) 2
(
y2 − ym
)
...
...
2(xm−1 − xm) 2
(
ym−1 − ym
)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
, X =
⎡
⎣
x
y
⎤
⎦,
b =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
x21 − x2m + y21 − y2m − d21 + d2m
x22 − x2m + y22 − y2m − d22 + d2m
...
x2m−1 − x2m + y2m−1 − y2m − d2m−1 + d2m
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
.
(2)
Using the MLE method, the location of the sensor can be
obtained as X̂ = (ATA)−1ATb.
3.2. Attack Model. The network is assumed to be deployed
in hostile environment where wormhole attacks exist to
disrupt the localization of sensors. During the wormhole
attack, one attacker sniﬀs packets at one point in the network
and tunnels them through the wormhole link to another
point. Being as external attackers that cannot compromise
legitimate nodes or their cryptographic keys, the wormhole
attackers cannot acquire the content, for example, the type
of the sniﬀed packets. However, the attackers may drop oﬀ
the received packets randomly which severely deteriorates the
sensor’s localization process. We assume that the length of
the wormhole link is larger than R so that the endless packet
transmission loop caused by both attackers is avoided.
The wormhole attack endured by a node can be classified
into duplex wormhole attack and simplex wormhole attack
according to the geometrical relation between the node and
the attackers. A node is under a duplex wormhole attack
when it lies in the common transmission area of these two
attackers; a node is under a simplex wormhole attack when
it lies in the transmission area of only one of these two
attackers but not in the common transmission area of both.
Figure 1 shows the impact of the wormhole attack on the
distance measurement of the sensor. When measuring the
distance, the sensor broadcasts a request signal and waits
for the responding beacon signals from the locators within
its neighboring vicinity, based on which the sensor can use
the RSSI method to estimate the distances to neighboring
locators. For the duplex wormhole attack as shown in
Figure 1(a), when L1 sends a beacon message to the sensor
S, S will only get the distance measurement as d′0 instead
of the actual distance d′1 because the RSSI received by S
just reflects the propagational attenuation from A1 to S. For
L2’s beacon message, as the packet will travel through two
diﬀerent paths to reach S, L2 → S and L2 → A2 → A1 → S,
respectively, S will obtain two distance measurements d′2 and
d′0. For L4’s beacon message, it travels through three paths
to reach S, L4 → S, L4 → A2 → A1 → S, and L4 →
A1 → A2 → S, respectively, thus S will get three distance
measurements as d′4,d
′
0, and d
′′
0 . For the simplex wormhole
attack as shown in Figure 1(b), when S receives the beacon
message from L5, it will measure the distance to L5 as d0. For
L3, two diﬀerent distance measurements d′3 and d0 will be
obtained. Thus, the locators which can communicate with
the sensor via the wormhole link will introduce incorrect
distance measurements.
All the locators that can exchange messages with the
sensor, either via the wormhole link or not, are called
neighboring locators (N-locators) of the sensor. Among these
neighboring locators, the ones that can exchange messages
with the sensor via the wormhole link are called dubious
locators (D-locators), as their distance measurements may
be incorrect and distort the localization; the locators that
lie in the transmission range of the sensor are called
valid locators (V-locators), as the sensor can obtain correct
distance measurements with respect to them and assist the
localization.
In this paper, we denote the set of N-locators, D-
locators, and V-locators as LN , LD, and LV . For the
scenario in Figure 1(a), LN = {L1,L2,L3,L4,L5,L6,L7},
LD = {L1,L2,L3,L4,L5,L7}, and LV = {L2,L3,L4,L6}. It is
obvious that LN = LV ∪LD.
4. Secure Localization Scheme Against
Wormhole Attack
As the D-locators will negatively aﬀect the localization of the
sensor, it is critical for the sensor to identify the V-locators
before the self-localization. In this section, we propose a
novel secure localization scheme against wormhole attacks,
which includes three phases shown in Figure 2, namely the
wormhole attack detection, valid locators identification and
self-localization.
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Figure 1: Illustrations of wormhole attack: (a) Duplex wormhole attack, (b) Simplex wormhole attack.
Messages
from locators
Wormhole attack
detection Detected?
Valid locators
identification
Self-localization
No
Yes
Figure 2: Flow chart of the proposed secure localization scheme.
(i) Wormhole Attack Detection: The sensor detects the
existence of a wormhole attack using the proposed
detection schemes, and identifies whether it is under
a duplex wormhole attack or a simplex wormhole
attack.
(ii) Valid Locators Identification: Corresponding to the
duplex wormhole attack and the simplex wormhole
attack, the sensor identifies the V-locators using
diﬀerent identification approaches.
(iii) Self-localization: After identifying enoughV-locators,
the sensor conducts the self-localization using the
MLE method with correct distance measurements.
4.1. Wormhole Attack Detection. We assume that each locator
periodically broadcasts a beacon message within its neigh-
boring vicinity. The beacon message will contain the ID
and location information of the source locator. When the
network is threatened by a wormhole attack, some aﬀected
locators will detect the abnormality through beacon message
exchanges. The following scenarios are considered abnormal
for locators: (1) a locator receives the beacon message sent by
itself; (2) a locator receives more than one copy of the same
beacon message from another locator via diﬀerent paths; (3)
a locator receives a beacon message from another locator,
whose location calculated based on the received message is
outside the transmission range of receiving locator. When the
locator detects the message abnormality, it will consider itself
under a wormhole attack. Moreover, if the locator detects
the message abnormality under the first scenario, that is,
the locator receives the beacon message sent by itself, it will
further derive that it is under a duplex wormhole attack. The
beacon message has two additional bits to indicate these two
statuses for each locator:
(i) detection bit: this bit will be set to 1 if the locator
detects the message abnormality through beacon
message exchanges; otherwise, this bit will be 0;
(ii) type bit: this bit will be 1 if the locator detects itself
under a duplex wormhole attack; otherwise, this bit
will be 0.
When the sensor performs self-localization, it broadcasts
a Loc req message to its N-locators. As soon as the locator
receives the Loc req message from the sensor, it replies with
an acknowledgement message Loc ack similar to the beacon
message, which includes the ID and location information
of the locator. The Loc ack message also includes above two
status bits. When the sensor receives the Loc ack message, it
can measure the distance from the sending locator to itself
using the RSSI. The sensor also calculates the response time
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of each N-locator based on the Loc ack message using the
approach in [17] to countervail the random delay on the
MAC layer of the locator: when broadcasting the Loc req
packet, the sensor records the local time T0. Every locator gets
the local time T1 by time-stamping the packet at the MAC
layer (i.e., the time when the packet is received at the MAC
layer) instead of time-stamping the packet at the application
layer. Similarly, when responding to the Loc ack packet, the
locator puts the local time T2 at the MAC layer; both T1 and
T2 are attached in the Loc ack packet. When receiving the
Loc ack packet, the sensor gets its local timeT3, and calculates
the response time of the locator as (T3−T0)−(T2−T1). Note
that this response time only eliminates the random delay at
the MAC layer of the locators, but not the delay aﬀected by
attackers.
When conducting the localization, the sensor may also
detect the message abnormality when it receives the Loc req
message sent by itself. Moreover, the sensor can check the
detection bit of the Loc ack message to decide if its N-locator
is under a wormhole attack or not.
We propose to use the following two detection schemes
for the sensor to detect the wormhole attack.
Detection Scheme D1. If the sensor S detects that it receives
the Loc req message sent from itself, it can determine that it
is currently under a duplex wormhole attack. For example,
when the sensor is under the duplex wormhole attack as
shown in Figure 1(a), the Loc req message transmitted by
the sensor can travel from A1 via the wormhole link to A2
and then arrive at S after being relayed by A2. Similarly, the
Loc req message can also travel from A2 through the worm-
hole link to A1 and then be received by S. Thus, S can deter-
mine that it is currently under a duplex wormhole attack.
Detection Scheme D2. If the sensor S detects that the
detection bit of the received Loc ack message from any N-
locator is set to 1, S can determine that it is under a simplex
wormhole attack. Note that when using detection scheme
D2, the sensor may generate a false alarm if the sensor
is outside the transmission areas of the attackers but any
of its N-locators is inside the transmission areas of the
attackers. However, this will only trigger the validate locators
identification process but not aﬀect the self-localization
result.
The pseudocode of the wormhole attack detection is
shown in Algorithm 1. The sensor broadcasts a Loc req
message for self-localization. When receiving the Loc req
message, each N-locator replies a Loc ack message with the
status bits indicating whether it has detected the abnormality.
The sensor measures the distances to its N-locators based
on the Loc ack messages using RSSI method and calculates
the response time of each N-locator. If the sensor receives
the Loc req message sent by itself (detection scheme D1),
it determines that it is under a duplex wormhole attack.
Otherwise, if the sensor is informed by any N-locator that the
abnormality is detected (detection scheme D2), it declares
that it is under a simplex wormhole attack. If no wormhole
attack is detected, the sensor conducts the MLE localization.
1: Sensor broadcasts a Loc req message.
2: Each N-locator sends a Loc ack message to the sensor,
including the message abnormality detection result.
3: Sensor waits for the Loc ack messages to measure the
distance to each N-locator and to calculate the response
time of each N-locator.
4: if sensor detects the attack using scheme D1 then
5: A duplex wormhole attack is detected.
6: else if sensor detects the attack using scheme D2 then
7: A simplex wormhole attack is detected.
8: else
9: No wormhole attack is detected.
10: end if
Algorithm 1: Wormhole attack detection scheme.
4.2. Basic Valid Locators Identification Approach
4.2.1. Duplex Wormhole Attack. When detecting that it is
currently under a duplex wormhole attack, the sensor tries
to identify all its V-locators before the self-localization. Take
L2 in Figure 1(a) for example, when receiving the Loc req
message from the sensor, L2 will respond a Loc ack message
to the sensor. As the sensor lies in the transmission range of
L2, the Loc ack message can be received by the sensor directly.
In addition, the Loc ack message can also travel from A2 via
the wormhole link to A1 then arrive at the sensor. Therefore,
the sensor can receive the Loc ack message from L2 for more
than once. However, there will be three diﬀerent scenarios:
(1) the locator lies in the transmission range of the sensor and
its message is received by the sensor for three times (such as
L4 in Figure 1(a)); (2) the locator lies out of the transmission
range of the sensor and its message is received by the sensor
for twice (such as L7 in Figure 1(a)); (3) the locator lies in the
transmission range of the sensor and its message is received
by the sensor for twice (such as L2 in Figure 1(a)). We can see
that L2 and L4 are V-locators, but not V7. The sensor will use
the following valid locator identification scheme to find the
V-locators.
Identification Scheme I1. When the sensor is under a duplex
wormhole attack, if the sensor receives the Loc ack message of
an N-locator for three times and the type bit in the Loc ack
message is set to 1, this N-locator will be considered as a
V-locator (such as L4 in Figure 1(a)). As the sensor only
countervails the MAC layer delay of the locators but not
that of the attackers when calculating the response time,
the message traveling via the wormhole link has taken a
longer response time. Thus, the distance measurement based
on the Loc ack message from this V-locator which takes
the shortest response time will be considered correct. If the
sensor receives the Loc ack message of an N-locator just
twice and the type bit in the Loc ack message is set to 1,
this N-locator will be treated as a D-locator (such as L7
in Figure 1(a)). For the last scenario, if the sensor receives
the Loc ack message of an N-locator twice and the type bit
in the Loc ack message is set to 0, this N-locator will be
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considered as a V-locator, and the distance measurement
based on the Loc ack message with a shorter response time
will be considered as correct (such as L2 in Figure 1(a)).
Distance Consistency Property of Valid Locators. Assuming
a set of locators L = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xm, ym)} and
corresponding measured distances D = {d1,d2, . . . ,dm},
where (xi, yi) is the location of locator Li and di is the
measured distance from the sensor to Li, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Based on L and D, the estimated location of the sensor is
(x˜0, y˜0). The mean square error of the location estimation
is δ2 = ∑mi=1[di −
√
(x˜0 − xi)2 + ( y˜0 − yi)2]2/m. The distance
consistency property of valid locators states that the mean
square error of the location estimation based on the correct
distance measurements is lower than a small threshold while
the mean square error of the location estimation based on the
distance measurements which contains some incorrect ones
is not lower than the threshold.
We can further identify more V-locators using the
distance consistency property of valid locators.
Identification Scheme I2. If the sensor has determined no
less than two valid locators using identification scheme I1,
it can identify other valid locators by checking whether the
distance estimation is consistent. A predefined threshold τ2
of the mean square error is determined, that is, a distance
estimation with a mean square error smaller than τ2 is
considered to be consistent. As shown in Figure 1(a), the
sensor can identify L2,L3, and L4 as V-locators and obtain
the correct distance measurements to them. For other unde-
termined locators, the sensor can identify them one by one.
For example, to check whether L1 is a V-locator, the sensor
can estimate its own location based on the distance mea-
surements to L1,L2,L3, and L4. As the distance measurement
to L1 is incorrect, the mean square error of the estimated
distance measurements may exceed τ2, which means that
L1 is not a V-locator. When the sensor checks the distance
consistency of L2,L3,L4, and L6, it can get that the mean
square error is lower than τ2, thus L6 is treated as a V-locator,
and the distance measurement to L6 is correct. After checking
each of the undetermined N-locators, the sensor can identify
all V-locators with the correct distance measurements.
4.2.2. SimplexWormhole Attack. If the sensor detects that it is
under a simplex wormhole attack, it will adopt the following
valid locators identification schemes.
Identification Scheme I3. When the sensor under a simplex
wormhole attack as shown in Figure 1(b), if the sensor
receives the Loc ack message of an N-locator twice, this N-
locator will be considered as a V-locator. For example, when
L3 in Figure 1(b) replies a Loc ack message to the sensor,
this message will travel through two diﬀerent paths to the
sensor, one directly from L3 to the sensor and the other from
L3 to A1 via the wormhole link to the sensor. Therefore,
the sensor can conclude that L3 is a V-locator. To further
obtain the correct distance measurement to L3, the sensor
compares the response times of the Loc ack message from L3
through diﬀerent paths, and the distance measurement with
a shorter response time is considered correct. Similarly, L4
can also be identified as a V-locator and its correct distance
measurement can be obtained.
The following spatial property can also be used to
identify V-locators:
Spatial Property. The sensor cannot receive messages from
two N-locators simultaneously if the distance between these
two N-locators is larger than 2R.
Identification Scheme I4. When the sensor is under a simplex
wormhole attack as shown in Figure 1(b), if the spatial
property is violated by two N-locators, it is obviously that
one of them is a V-locator and the other is a D-locator. Take
L2 and L5 in Figure 1(b) for example, the distance between
them is larger than 2R, after receiving Loc ack messages from
them, the sensor can detect that the spatial property does
not hold by these two N-locators. The response times of
both N-locators can be used to diﬀerentiate the V-locator
from the D-locator. As the Loc ack message from L5 travels
via the wormhole link to the sensor, it will take a longer
response time than that from L2. The sensor will regard
L2 as a V-locator and L5 as a D-locator because L2 has a
shorter response time. The distance measurement to L2 is
also considered correct.
We can also use the distance consistency property of valid
locators to identify moreV-locators when the sensor is under
a simplex wormhole attack.
Identification Scheme I5. When the sensor is under a simplex
wormhole attack, similar to identification scheme I2, if the
sensor detects at least two V-locators using identification
schemes I3 and I4, it can identify other V-locators based
on the distance consistency property of V-locators. Take the
scenario in Figure 1(b) for example, the sensor can identify
L2,L3, and L4 as V-locators and obtain the correct distance
measurements to them. The sensor can further identify other
V-locators by checking the distance consistency. A mean
square error smaller than τ2 can be obtained when the sensor
estimates its location based on L1,L2,L3, and L4 because they
are all V-locators. So the sensor can conclude that L1 is a V-
locator and the distance measurement to L1 is correct.
The procedure of basic valid locators identification
approach is listed in Algorithm 2: If the sensor detects
that it is under a duplex wormhole attack, it will conduct
identification scheme I1 to detect V-locators. As the distance
consistency check needs as least three locators, if the
sensor identifies no less than two V-locators, it can use
identification scheme I2 to identify other V-locators. On the
other hand, if the sensor detects that it is under a simplex
wormhole attack, it adopts identification schemes I3 and
I4 to identify the V-locators. After that, if at least two V-
locators are identified, the sensor conducts identification
scheme I5 to detect other V-locators.
4.3. Enhanced Valid Locators Identification Approach. In the
basic valid locators identification approach, if the sensor
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 7
1: if S detects a duplex wormhole attack then
2: Conduct scheme I1 to identify V-locators.
3: if the identified V-locators ≥2 then
4: Conduct scheme I2 to identify other V-locators.
5: end if
6: else if S detects a simplex wormhole attack then
7: Conduct schemes I3 and I4 to identify V-locators.
8: if the identified V-locators ≥2 then
9: Conduct scheme I5 to identify other V-locators.
10: end if
11: end if
Algorithm 2: Basic Valid Locators Identification Approach.
identifies less than three V-locators, it will terminate the
self-localization because the MLE method used in the self-
localization needs at least three distance measurements.
However, when using the identification schemes based
on distance consistency property of V-locators, many V-
locators may not be identified if the threshold of mean square
error, τ2, is set inappropriately a small value.
To overcome the above problem, we propose an
enhanced valid locators identification approach which can
adaptively adjust the threshold τ2 to make the sensor easier to
identify more V-locators: If the sensor detects that it is under
a duplex wormhole attack, it conducts identification scheme
I1 to detect V-locators. If the sensor identifies no less than
two V-locators, it repeats to identify other V-locators using
identification scheme I2 and update the τ2 with an increment
of Δτ2 until at least three V-locators are identified or τ2 is
larger than τ2max. On the other hand, if the sensor detects that
it is under a simplex wormhole attack, it adopts schemes I3
and I4 to identify the V-locators. If at least two V-locators
are identified, the sensor repeats to conduct scheme I5 to
detect other V-locators and update τ2 with an increment
of Δτ2 until at least three V-locators are identified or τ2
is larger than τ2max. The procedure of the enhanced valid
locators identification approach is listed in Algorithm 3.
After the wormhole attack detection and valid locators
identification, the sensor can identify V-locators from its N-
locators. Furthermore, the sensor can estimate the correct
distance measurements to the V-locators. When the sensor
obtains at least three correct distance measurements to
its N-locators, it conducts the MLE localization based
on these distance measurements and the locations of the
corresponding N-locators.
5. Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we formulate the mathematical models for the
probability of wormhole attack detection and the probability
of successfully identifying all the V-locators. To simplify our
description, we denote the disk centered at U with radius R
as DR(U). The overlapped region of the transmission areas of
two attackers is denoted as D1 and the overlapped region of
the transmission areas of attacker A1 and sensor S is denoted
as D2, which are illustrated in Figure 3.
1: if S detects a duplex wormhole attack then
2: Conduct scheme I1 to identify V-locators.
3: if the identified V-locators ≥2 then
4: repeat
5: Conduct scheme I2 to identify other V-locators.
6: τ2 ⇐ τ2 + Δτ2
7: until the identified V-locators ≥3 or τ2 > τ2max
8: end if
9: else if S detects a simplex wormhole attack then
10: Conduct schemes I3 and I4 to identify V-locators.
11: if the identified V-locators ≥2 then
12: repeat
13: Conduct scheme I5 to identify other V-locators.
14: τ2 ⇐ τ2 + Δτ2
15: until the identified V-locators ≥3 or τ2 > τ2max
16: end if
17: end if
Algorithm 3: Enhanced Valid Locators Identification Approach.
5.1. Probability of Wormhole Attack Detection. For the prob-
ability of the wormhole attack detection, we denote it as
Pdet, including the probability of the duplex wormhole attack
detection PDdet and the probability of the simplex wormhole
attack detection PSdet. Thus,
Pdet = PDdet + PSdet. (3)
For PDdet, it equals to the probability that the sensor lies in
the region D1. Therefore,
PDdet =
D1
πR2
. (4)
Here,
D1 = 2R2arccos L2R − L
√
R2 − L
2
4
, (5)
where L is the length of the wormhole link.
For PSdet, the probability that the sensor lies in region
DR(A2)\D1 in Figure 3 equals to (πR2−D1)/πR2. When the
sensor lies in this region, the sensor can detect the wormhole
attack only if at least one locator lies in D1 or each of the
regions DR(A2) \D1 and DR(A1) \D1 in Figure 3 has at least
one locator, which means that the N-locators can detect the
abnormality and inform the sensor. We define the event that
at least one locator lies in D1 as A and the event that each of
the regions DR(A2) \ D1 and DR(A1) \ D1 in Figure 3 has at
least one locator as B. Thus,
PSdet =
πR2 −D1
πR2
(
P(A) + P
(
A
)
P(B)
)
. (6)
As the locators follow Poisson distribution, we get
P(A) = 1− e−D1ρl
P(B) =
[
1− e−(πR2−D1)ρl
]2
,
(7)
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Figure 3: Theoretical analysis of the mathematical model of a
wormhole attack.
where ρl is the density of the locators. Therefore, the
probability that the sensor can detect the simplex wormhole
attack can be expressed as follows:
PSdet =
πR2 −D1
πR2
{
1− e−D1ρl + e−D1ρl
[
1− e−(πR2−D1)ρl
]2}
= πR
2 −D1
πR2
{
1− e−πR2ρl
[
2− e−(πR2−D1)ρl
]}
.
(8)
Therefore, we can get
Pdet = PDdet + PSdet
= D1
πR2
+
πR2 −D1
πR2
{
1− e−πR2ρl
[
2− e−(πR2−D1)ρl
]}
= 1− πR
2 −D1
πR2
e−πR
2ρl
[
2− e−(πR2−D1)ρl
]
.
(9)
5.2. Probability of Successfully Identifying All V-locators. For
the probability that the sensor can successfully identify all the
V-locators, we denote it as Pide. Similarly,
Pide = PDide + PSide, (10)
where PDide is the probability that the sensor can successfully
identify all the V-locators when under a duplex wormhole
attack, and PSide is for the simplex wormhole attack.
The probability that the sensor is under a duplex
wormhole attack equals to D1/πR2 as shown in Figure 3. The
sensor is capable of successfully identifying all the V-locators
under a duplex wormhole attack means that it can identify at
least two V-locators using identification scheme I1. That is,
the region (DR(A1)∪DR(A2))∩DR(S) in Figure 1(a) has at
least two locators. Thus,
PDide =
D1
πR2
(
1− e−D3ρl −D3ρle−D3ρl
)
= D1
πR2
[
1− e−D3ρl(1 + D3ρl
)]
,
(11)
where
D1 = 2R2arccos L2R − L
√
R2 − L
2
4
(12)
and D3 is the area of (DR(A1) ∪ DR(A2)) ∩ DR(S) in
Figure 1(a). We can approximate D3 by
D3 ≈ DDR(A2)∩DR(S) + D2, (13)
where
D2 = 2R2arccos L
′
2R
− L′
√√
√
√
(
R2 − L
′2
4
)
,
L′ =
√
(x − L)2 + y2.
(14)
We can get
D3 ≈ 2R2arccos L
′
2R
− L′
√
√
√√
(
R2 − L
′2
4
)
+ 2R2arccos
√
x2 + y2
2R
−
√
√√
√(x2 + y2
)
(
R2 − x
2 + y2
4
)
.
(15)
When the sensor is under a wormhole attack, the
probability that it lies in the dxdy domain in Figure 3 equals
to dxdy/πR2. When lying in the dxdy domain, if the sensor
can identify at least two V-locators using identification
schemes I3 and I4, it can successfully identify other V-
locators. Assuming that the sensor can identify m V-locators
using scheme I3 and identify n V-locators using scheme I4,
the probability that the sensor can identify at least two V-
locators using schemes I3 and I4 is calculated as
1− P(m = 0)P(n = 0)− P(m = 0)P(n = 1)
− P(m = 1)P(n = 0),
(16)
where
P(m = 0) = e−D2ρl , P(m = 1) = D2ρle−D2ρl ,
P(n = 0) = e−D4ρl , P(n = 1) = D4ρle−D4ρl .
(17)
Here, D4 is the region in DR(S) which is more than 2R away
from at least one of the locators in DR(A1), that is the area of
the corresponding shading region D4 in Figure 3. Note that if
any locator lies in D4, the sensor can identify it as a V-locator
using identification scheme I4.
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Figure 4: Probability of wormhole attack detection: Our scheme
versus SeRLoc scheme.
Thus,
PSide =
1
πR2
∫∫
DR(A2)\D1
Pxydx dy, (18)
where
Pxy = 1− e−(D2+D4)ρl
[
1 + (D2 + D4)ρl
]
. (19)
Therefore, we can obtain
Pide= D1
πR2
[
1−e−D3ρl(1+D3ρl
)]
+
1
πR2
∫∫
DR(A2)\D1
Pxydx dy.
(20)
6. Simulation Evaluation
In this section, we present the simulation results to demon-
strate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed secure localization
scheme and to validate our theoretical results. The network
parameters are set as follows: the transmission range R of all
types of nodes is identical and is set to 15 m; the density of
locators ρl = 0.006/m2 (with the average degree around 4);
the standard deviation of the distance measurement σ = 0.5;
the label L/R of the x axis denotes the ratio of the length of
the wormhole link (i.e., the distance between two attackers)
to the transmission range. The threshold for the distance
consistency τ2 = 1. For the enhanced secure localization
scheme, Δτ2 = 1 and τ2max = 5.
Figure 4 demonstrates the performance comparison of
the probability of detecting the wormhole attack between
our scheme and SeRLoc scheme. It can be observed that our
scheme obtains a good performance with the probabilities
higher than 98% for diﬀerent values of L/R. Although both
schemes have the similar performance when L/R > 3.5, our
scheme outperforms SeRLoc scheme, especially when L/R <
2.
0.9
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
of
w
or
m
h
ol
e
at
ta
ck
de
te
ct
io
n
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
L/R
Simulation
Theoretical
Figure 5: Probability of wormhole attack detection: Simulation
versus Theoretical.
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Figure 6: Probability of successful localization.
Figure 5 demonstrates the validity of our theoretical
analysis on the probability of the wormhole attack detection.
We find that the maximum diﬀerence between the simula-
tion and the theoretical result is smaller than 0.4%, which
indicates that the theoretical result matches the simulation
result very well.
Figure 6 shows the performance comparison, in terms
of the probability of successful localization, of our proposed
basic scheme, SeRLoc scheme, the consistency scheme [13],
and the scheme without any detection process when the
sensor is under a wormhole attack. The SeRLoc scheme
first identifies some D-locators using the sector uniqueness
property and communication range violation property,
then conducts self-localization based on the rest locators.
However, SeRLoc scheme does not distinguish the duplex
10 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
of
su
cc
es
sf
u
ll
oc
al
iz
at
io
n
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
L/R
Basic scheme
Enhanced scheme
Figure 7: Probability of successful localization: Basic scheme versus
Enhanced scheme.
wormhole attack and simplex wormhole attack, and the
communication range violation property may be invalid
under the duplex wormhole attack. The consistency scheme
identifies the D-locators based on the consistency check
of the estimation result. The locator which is the most
inconsistent one will be considered as a D-locator. In this
simulation, the localization result is considered successful
when derr1 ≤ derr2 + ftol ∗ R, where derr1 (and derr2) denotes
the localization error with (and without) using the secure
localization scheme, ftol is the factor of localization error
tolerance (0.1 in our simulations). The performance of the
scheme without any detection process shows the severe
impact of the wormhole attack on the localization process,
which makes the localization totally defunct when L/R is
larger than 2. Figure 6 shows that our proposed scheme
obtains much better performance than the other schemes.
Figure 7, we compare the basic secure localization
scheme with the enhanced secure localization scheme. The
enhanced scheme outperforms the basic scheme a bit higher
(with the maximum improvement of about 3%) when
L/R < 3.
Figure 8 shows the performance of successful localization
of the enhanced scheme under diﬀerent locator densities. It
demonstrates that the increase of the locator density has a
greater improvement when L/R < 3 than when L/R > 3.
Figure 9 is to validate the correctness of the theoretical
result of the probability of successfully identifying all V-
locators. The maximum diﬀerence between the simulation
and the theoretical result is about 4%, showing that the
theoretical result matches the simulation result well.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we analyze the impact of the wormhole
attack on the range-based localization. We propose a novel
distance-consistency-based secure localization mechanism
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Figure 8: Probability of successful localization under diﬀerent
locator densities.
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Figure 9: Probability of successfully identifying all V-locators:
Simulation versus Theoretical.
against wormhole attacks including the wormhole attack
detection, valid locators identification and self-localization.
To analyze the performance of our proposed scheme, we
build the theoretical model for calculating the probability of
detecting the wormhole attack and the probability of iden-
tifying all V-locators. We also present the simulation results
to demonstrate the out-performance of our schemes and the
validity of the proposed theoretical analysis. Although the
proposed approach is described based on the RSSI method,
it can be easily applied to the localization approaches based
on the time-of-arrival (ToA) or time-diﬀerence-of-arrival
(TDoA) methods.
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In the future, our work will focus on the secure locali-
zation when the sensor is under multiple wormholes’ attack
simultaneously. We also intend to consider the secure locali-
zation when diﬀerent nodes have diﬀerent transmission
ranges.
Acknowledgments
This work is supported in part by Grants PolyU 5236/06E,
PolyU 5243/08E, A-PJ16, NSFC 60873223, NSFC 90818010,
and ZJU-SKL ICT0903.
References
[1] I. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “A
survey on sensor networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 40, no. 8, pp. 102–114, 2002.
[2] A. Savvides, C. Han, and M. Strivastava, “Dynamic fine-
grained localization in ad-hoc networks of sensors,” in
Proceedings of the ACM Annual International Conference on
Mobile Computing and Networking (MOBICOM ’01), pp. 166–
179, Rome, Italy, July 2001.
[3] M. Zhao and S. D. Servetto, “An analysis of the maximum
likelihood estimator for localization problems,” in Proceedings
of the 2nd International Conference on Broadband Networks
(ICBN ’05), pp. 59–67, Boston, Mass, USA, October 2005.
[4] P. Bahl and V. N. Padmanabhan, “RADAR: an in-building
RF-based user location and tracking system,” in Proceedings
of the 9th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies (INFOCOM ’00), vol. 2, pp. 775–
784, Tel Aviv, Israel, March 2000.
[5] Z. Li, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and B. Nath, “Robust statistical
methods for securing wireless localization in sensor networks,”
in Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Informa-
tion Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN ’05), pp. 91–98, Los
Angeles, Calif, USA, April 2005.
[6] G. Mao, B. Fidan, and B. D. O. Anderson, “Wireless sensor
network localization techniques,” Computer and Telecommu-
nications Networking, vol. 51, no. 10, pp. 2529–2553, 2007.
[7] S. Capkun and J. P. Hubaux, “Secure positioning of wireless
devices with application to sensor networks,” in Proceedings
of the 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies (INFOCOM ’05), vol. 2, pp. 1917–
1928, March 2005.
[8] M. Khabbazian, H. Mercier, and V. K. Bhargava, “Wormhole
attack in wireless ad hoc networks: analysis and counter-
measure,” in Proceedings of the Global Telecommunications
Conference (GLOBECOM ’06), San Francisco, Calif, USA,
December 2006.
[9] L. Lazos and R. Poovendran, “SeRLoc: robust localization
for wireless sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor
Networks, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 73–100, 2005.
[10] L. Lazos and R. Poovendran, “HiRLoc: high-resolution robust
localization for wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 233–246,
2006.
[11] A. Boukerche, H. A. B. F. Oliveira, E. F. Nakamura, and A. A.
F. Loureiro, “Secure localization algorithms for wireless sensor
networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 46, no. 4, pp.
96–101, 2008.
[12] A. Srinivasan and J. Wu, “A survey on secure localization
in wireless sensor networks,” in Encyclopedia of Wireless and
Mobile Communications, 2007.
[13] D. Liu, P. Ning, and W. Du, “Attack-resistant location
estimation in sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 4th
International Symposium on Information Processing in Sensor
Networks (IPSN ’05), pp. 99–106, Los Angeles, Calif, USA,
April 2005.
[14] S. Capkun, M. Cagalj, and M. Srivastava, “Secure localization
with hidden and mobile base stations,” in Proceedings of the
25th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communica-
tions Societies (INFOCOM ’06), Barcelona, Spain, April 2006.
[15] L. Lazos, R. Poovendran, and S. Capkun, “ROPE: robust posi-
tion estimation in wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of
the 4th International Symposium on Information Processing in
Sensor Networks (IPSN ’05), pp. 324–331, Los Angeles, Calif,
USA, April 2005.
[16] D. Liu, P. Ning, and W. Du, “Detecting malicious bea-
con nodes for secure location discovery in wireless sensor
networks,” in Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS ’05),
June 2005.
[17] H. Chen, W. Lou, J. Ma, and Z. Wang, “TSCD: a novel
secure localization approach for wireless sensor networks,”
in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Sensor
Technologies and Applications (SensorComm ’08), pp. 661–666,
Cap Esterel, France, August 2008.
[18] Y. C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Packet leashes:
a defense against wormhole attacks in wireless networks,”
in Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Conference of the IEEE
Computer and Communications Societies (INFOCOM ’03), vol.
3, pp. 1976–1986, San Franciso, Calif, USA, April 2003.
[19] W. Wang and B. Bhargava, “Visualization of wormholes in
sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on
Wireless Security (WiSec ’04), pp. 51–60, New York, NY, USA,
2004.
[20] W. Wang and A. Lu, “Interactive wormhole detection and
evaluation,” Information Visualization, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 3–17,
2007.
[21] R. Maheshwari, J. Gao, and S. R. Das, “Detecting wormhole
attacks in wireless networks using connectivity information,”
in Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM ’07), pp. 107–115, Anchorage,
Alaska, USA, May 2007.
[22] H. Chen, W. Lou, and Z. Wang, “Conflicting-set-based worm-
hole attack resistant localization in wireless sensor networks,”
in Proceedings of the 6th International Conference onUbiquitous
Intelligence and Computing (UIC ’09), Brisbane, Australia, July
2009.
